International Dialogue
Volume 10

Article 9

11-2020

A Savage Order: How the World’s Deadliest Countries Can Forge a
Path to Security
Thomas Manig

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/id-journal
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, International and Area Studies Commons,
International and Intercultural Communication Commons, International Relations Commons, and the
Political Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Manig, Thomas (2020) "A Savage Order: How the World’s Deadliest Countries Can Forge a Path to
Security," International Dialogue: Vol. 10, Article 9.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32873/uno.dc.ID.10.1.1183
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/id-journal/vol10/iss1/9

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open
access by the The Goldstein Center for Human Rights at
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for
inclusion in International Dialogue by an authorized editor
of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please
contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.

ID: International Dialogue, A Multidisciplinary Journal of World Affairs 10 2020

Review
A Savage Order:
How the World’s Deadliest Countries
Can Forge a Path to Security
Rachel Kleinfeld. New York: Pantheon Books, 2018. 475pp.

Thomas Manig *
Rachel Kleinfeld studies international conflicts and methods of reducing violence.
Previously she published Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad: Next Generation Reform
(2012). She is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She has
advised government officials on problems of international security.
Kleinfeld’s new book, A Savage Order: How the World’s Deadliest Countries
Can Forge a Path to Security, is characterized by social scientific methodology rather than
abstract theorizing. This book disposes of simplistic generalizations, like the belief that
violence is inevitable in certain ethnic groups or localities, or the contrary belief that we
can end violence by sitting down and having deep conversations that put people in touch
with their gentle side.
Kleinfeld’s approach relies instead on data and case studies to draw conclusions
about the kinds of violence that exist, and about what methods are likely to work to reduce
violence in the world. The cases she describes in A Savage Order come from places like
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Colombia, Sicily, Ghana, Republic of Georgia, and India, where seemingly intractable
large-scale violence has been common.
The book is surprisingly easy to read, considering its hundred pages of endnotes
and forty-eight page bibliography.
Early in the book, Kleinfeld tests some familiar suppositions about the correlates
and kinds of violence by using statistics and counterexamples. We might have supposed
that the biggest category of violent deaths are ones that occur during wartime. But statistics
show that many of the violent deaths happen during peacetime, and are directly or
indirectly attributable to political factors like corrupt states or weak states. We might have
supposed that violent deaths are sure to be concentrated in places that have poverty, ethnic
enclaves, or religious orthodoxies. But there are exceptions to all of these preconceived
patterns.
The book is divided into three parts: (I) The problem; (II) The solution; and (III)
Next steps.
In the first part, we can recognize the influence of Thomas Hobbes. Without the
benefit of statistics, Hobbes was convinced that weak states would be unable to guarantee
public safety in times of factional violence: the factions could “overawe” the government.
And Kleinfeld believes that this generalization is now well-supported by the evidence. She
also describes a new category of violence that she calls “privilege violence.” This kind of
violence can arise even when the state is strong. Here, a privileged group may control the
state, and may use state violence against outsiders to maintain its dominant position. Also,
when these outsiders have conflicts among themselves and need police protection, no one
comes to help. Either way, violence increases.
In the organization of the first two parts, we can see the influence of the sociologist
Norbert Elias, who was known for his investigations of the civilizing process. In part I, the
rise of hotspots of violence is described as “decivilization,” and in part II, the exercise of
certain devices of Realpolitik is supposed to help bring about “recivilization.” In part II
Kleinfeld affirms the usefulness of a powerful centralized government. She shares some of
Elias’s observations to illustrate the connection between centralized political power and
the reduction of violence. Before the feudal system was fully established in France, the
petty nobles who stayed at their scattered estates could inflict violence on their serfs with
impunity. The French kings eventually saw that it was advantageous to command the petty
nobles to move to the capital and live as courtiers. There the petty nobles had to replace
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their impulsive ways with refined aristocratic manners. Arbitrary, impulsive violence faded
away. People were more secure because of the kings’ consolidation of political power.
As a social scientist, Kleinfeld is aware of the limitations of moral persuasion. We
cannot go straight to the goal of a peaceful society. The means of achieving peace must
meet people at the level of their self-interests. “Dirty deals” are among the devices of
Realpolitik we are likely to need in the process of ending waves of violence. In many of
the case studies, we find criminal syndicates that use violence to maintain and expand their
wealth and privileges. The state that expects the consent of the people must do whatever it
takes to reduce the murder rate. In particular, the state may have to negotiate dirty deals
with the syndicate, in which the syndicate agrees to stop acts of violence in exchange for
the state’s overlooking other kinds of crimes (extortion, trafficking, etc.). Kleinfeld
understands that these dirty deals cannot solve all of the problems of a society. But dirty
deals can create a platform for gradually concentrating state power and ending the other
kinds of abuses.
In the part of A Savage Order that is about solutions, Kleinfeld also discusses the
role of the middle class. The middle class can be a moderating influence when countries
are subjected to privilege violence. The middle class has interests in stability and justice.
Kleinfeld examines the complicated history of the middle class as an agent of reform or as
an agent of indifference or repression. Although a solution to the problem of privilege
violence may require a middle class that is committed to reform, the cases described by
Kleinfeld are not very reassuring. It is not unusual for the members of the middle class to
look the other way or to support repression when the members of the lower class are
victimized.
Kleinfeld also discusses political movements in the part about solutions. Briefly,
her argument underlines the requirement that the movements be political. There are
anecdotes about the effectiveness of moral or religious persuasion, but Kleinfeld argues
that these are neither broadly nor permanently effective. These ends can only be assured
by movements that affect the structure of political power.
The third part of the book is: Next steps. In much of this part, Kleinfeld offers sound advice
about American policy toward hotspots of violence in the world, ranging from foreign aid
to tourism.
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The third part also reminds us of the boundaries of Kleinfeld’s project. The next
steps are intended to show us plausible paths towards greater security, while paying close
attention to what is distinctive in each country.
Outside the boundaries of Kleinfeld’s project are the paths towards other aspects
of a good society, chiefly justice. When Kleinfeld discusses fairness, she describes it as
something so fundamental, so primal, that its absence often makes governments fall. Yet
in the third part of the book, she says
So the real issue is not this loud, stale debate over justice versus peace.
Instead, it is the thorny task of crafting agreements that violent individuals
are willing to sign, which also include future-oriented provisions that will
slowly reduce their political and economic power over time.

Such

provisions can increase the chances that a short-term deal doesn’t result
in the long-term degradation of the state. (276–77)
But the debate over justice versus peace is indispensable. Many revolutionists
have held that it is worth risking one’s life to achieve justice. It is understandable that in
this book, Kleinfeld focuses on peace but not justice. The social-scientific evidence that is
relevant to achieving peace can easily fill a book. But other investigators will need to show
the way to other morally important ends.

